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Chairman:
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The current problems with the Forest Service are well
documented. Due to its roots in the Progressive Era, the
Forest Service has not evolved into an agency capable of
balancing the competing needs of public forest users.
Instead, overcentralization and budget structure have
resulted’ in a top-down management approach that loses money
and perpetuates losses of biodiversity. These problems with
the Forest Service have evolved for almost a century and are
too ingrained to be addressed by any piecemeal reform.
Instead, a large scale reform of the entire structure needs
to initiated and a new paradigm fpr public forest management
instituted.
Based on policies in the school trust lands context, a
trust paradigm would have many advantages for national
forest management. Trusts provide clear mandates for. the
trustee, instead of confusing multiple use mandates. Most
of the current economic disincentives would be eliminated
under a trust paradigm. The competing duties of making the
trust productive and preserving the corpus of the trust
force trustees to balance short term economic needs with
long term preservation.
The "National Forest Trust Act", as proposed-and modified
in this paper, can provide a worthwhile departure into
examining how a national forest trust would be created.
Trust language mandates that lands be managed in accordance
with accepted trust principles while implementing ecosystem
management. This management structre would provide a clean
break with ingrained multiple use, sustained yield practices
and usher in a new era of national forest management.
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I.

Introduction

Like a predictable lunar cycle,, the debate over how to
manage our public lands has once again entered the
mainstream.

Thanks to commentators such as Jon Souder and

Sally Fairfax, a new management paradigm has also been
thrown into the debate: the trust. As a model of trust
management, the state school trust lands are being examined
as an alternative to large federal.agency management.

This

is particularly surprising 'given the unfavorable reputation
that the state has so far developed in the public lands
context.1'
Shifts in traditional interest group alliances may
provide some answers as to why the conventional wisdom of
states as land managers seems to be changing.

For most of

this century, debates over how to manage public land was
dominated by two 'factions: multiple use conservationists vs.
wilderness preservationists.2 However, as we enter into
,1
Sally K. Fairfax', Thinking the Unthinkable: States
as Public Land Managers, 3 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl L. &
Pol'y 249, 254-256 (1996). Professor Fairfax identifies
cycles of state primacy that occurred within the context of
federal land management. Now that we are in the era of land
retention, state managers are vilified-by environmentalists
as being anti-retention and dishonestly- admired by sagebrush
rebels, despite the fact that they have the, most to lose
from transferring federal land to the states. Id. at 255256.
2
This conflict, is basically an extension of the
Gifford Pinchot vs. John Muir disputes of the early 20th
century.

the twentieth century, the solidarity of either side is
beginning to break down as individual interest groups are
seeing new allies.3 One commentator identifies five
factors as an explanation for the sudden focus on state land
management as a model for federal land management: the rise
of grassroots environmentalism, the introduction of natural
resource economics, landscape level thinking, the end of
Progressive Era science and the observation that the land
management problems of the west are also being experienced
/

'

in the east.4 While the implications of these shifting
alliances is beyond the scope of this paper, expanding, the
tools of the debate to include trusts will play a positive
role in examining reform of the current system.
The current literature examining state land management
focuses on school trust lands as a comparative model for.
possible federal land management.5 These commentators have

3
Of particular interest is the strained
similarities between deep ecologists and libertarian
economists. Robert Nelson, Government as Theater: Towards a
New Paradigm for the Public hands, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 33 5,
355-356 (1994). Another, example is the local management
alternative for reintroduction of grizzly bears- to the
Bitterroot ecosystem that is co-sponsored by the InterMountain Forestry Products A s s o c N a t i o n a l Wildlife
Federation, and Defenders of Wildlife,. Bear With It:
Grizzly Re introduction Plan Worth A Try, Columbus Dispatch,
January 17, 1997, at 8A.
.• 4

Fairfax, supra note 1, at 256-257.

5
See generally Sally K. Fairfax, Jon A. Souder &
Greta Goldenman, The School Trust Lands: a Fresh Look at
Conventional Wisdom, 22 Envtl. L..797 (1992); Fairfax, supra
note 1.
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come to the conclusion that', while state trust management
could be a possible departure for reform, trust management
is not a: panacea for all the political inefficiencies of
public land management.6

It is doubtful that any of these

commentators would suggest a wholesale shift of land
ownership from federal to state governments.

Indeed, the

political realities would make such an idea virtually
impossible.7
This paper takes the next step in the debate and
examines how trust management of public lands would, possibly
be organized and what benefits of such a management scenario
would achieve.

Because the vast majority-of western public

land is held by the Forest Service, this paper >will examine
trust management in relation to that agency.®
'

This will
r

serve as both a narrowing feature and a commonality for
states in the northwest.
This paper is divided into three sections.
6

The first

Fairfax, supra note 1, at 262-263.

7
Two noted commentators,' Jack Ward Thomas and
Charles Wilkinson, capture popular opinion when they flatly
deny a large scale devolution of public ownership as a
viable solution.
Charles Wilkinson, The Public Lands and
the Public Heritage, Different Drummer,' Fall 1995, at 9;
Jack Ward Thomas, The View From the Top: Some Comments from
the Chief, 17 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 9, 21-22 (1996).
8
While some of the problems inherent in the Forest
Service can not be translated to other land management
agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management, it is
probable that many of the benefits of, forest trust
management could be imputed to those lands as well. .Indeed,
if successful ecosystem management is to be achieved, agency
boundaries need to be dissolved.

section will examine current failures of the Forest Service.
The first step for change is identifying the harm caused by
the status, quo.

In this section, I argue that the problems

found within the Forest Service are both 'imbedded and
intertwined.

Therefore, only a large scale paradigmatic

shift will bring about fruitful reform.
In the second section, I examine state school trust
lands.

I briefly analyze the competing trust duties of

state trust managers and how the courts have interpreted
these duties.

Trust land management is slowly evolving to

account for preservation goals as well as current income
production.

While few environmentalists regard state trust

lands as a model of ecological health, the organizational
structure of that trust could provide tangible benefits for
future land management.
In the third section, I examine a, trust bill proposed
by' the Thqreau Institute, and provide a model trust
agreement.

My intent is to identify some of the issues that

must be resolved if a trust management scheme were to be
offered as a paradigm for public land management.

II.

Failures in. U.S. Forest Service Management

Agency bashing is a time honored pastime in the
American west.

Because of its primacy in land stewardship

in the northwest, the Forest Service is then perhaps the
most reviled agency.

Some commentators argue that, despite

5
its shortcomings, the Forest Service is actually a very
capable manager.9
/

However mediocrity is not a valued trait in American
society.

The effectiveness of the Forest Service must be

debated so that new and better methods of land management
may be investigated.• This is especially true now that the
Service is seeking to implement cutting-edge science, such
as ecosystem management, and account for past policies that
have consistently lost money for the treasury..
There are three cote failures of modern forest
management:

Progressive Era science, overcentralization,

and economically inefficient policies.

These failures are

interwoven and closely related to one another.

One

shortcoming can not be individually corrected without
addressing them all.

Because of their interconnectedness,

piecemeal reform of the Forest Service is impracticable.

A

fundamental shift in the management paradigm must be
pursued.
A.

The Inability of Progressive Era Science to Adjust to
Realities of the Modern World

The Forest Service was
Era, in American society.10

created during the Progressive
Forest Management during the

Progressive Era was characterized by an unwavering faith in
science to provide answers to the complex and growing
9

Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 10.

10 . Robert H. Nelson, The Failure of Scientific
Management, Different Drummer, Fall 1995 at 13.

6

demands of American society.11

Scientific resource

management would ensure a constant supply of commodities,
thereby providing the greatest good for the greatest number
of Americans.
However, grounding modern forest management in ideas
that are over 100 years old presents several difficulties
for reforming today's Forest Service.

First, these ideas

are so ingrained that any large scale changes are unlikely
without a sweeping paradigmatic shift.

Second, the

unqualified, belief in science to provide answers ignores the
realities of a democratic society. . Third, the mechanisms
necessary to implement Progressive Era science, primarily
command and control regulation, have proven to be highly
inefficient methods of public land management.
Gifford Pinchot and his successors effectively
insulated the'Forest Service from the forces that
transformed other government agencies.12

This enabled the

progressive paradigm to take root and it drive Forest
Service decisions today.

Most foresters in the Service are

. 11
Nelson, supra note 3, at 344. The historical
context of the Progressive Era was set against a backdrop of
increasing industrialization, scientific discovery and the
turning from divine guidance to secular pursuits. Id.
12
This insulation created what some called an
"esprit de corps" or religious zeal" among Forest Service
employees in fulfilling their mission. Nelson supra*note
10, at 13. It was not until early 1970 when events such as
the Bolle report and the Mononoahela decision did the Forest
Service come under widespread public scrutiny for its
management practices. Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the
Next Meridian 140-144 (1992).

■

career employees that accept the beliefs and culture of
their profession.13
The culture of scientific management tends to evolve an
agency that is inflexible and unaccepting of change.14
Forest Service management has evolved into a near theology.:
the "religion of public land management."16

instead of

adapting to new information and challenges, the Forest
Service has stagnated under a distrust of outsiders from
other agencies or the private sector.16

The current

attitude of the Service can best be described as embattled,
creating a more introverted agency in an era where
extroversion is necessary, for wise and integrated
management.
Gifford Pinchot was a firm believer that politics and
scientific management did not mix.17 Ultimately,
scientific management necessitates the end of political
input into policy decisions.18

If resources are to be

managed scientifically by elite managers; the Forest Service
cannot afford to have public opinion second guessing its

13 ' Marion Clawson, The Economics of National Forest
Management 102 (1976) .
14

id*, at 103.-

15

Nelson, supra

16

Id. at 354; Clawson, supra note 13, at 103.

17

Nelson, supra

note 10, at 13.

18

Nelson, supra

note 3, at 345.

note 3, at 353.-
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decisions.

However, this belief ignores a basic tenet of

our democratic society: competing values and interests.19
After World War II, the number and power of interest
groups rose and demanded a.voice in the decision process.
With the Mononcrahela decision that declared clearcutting
illegal, interest groups successfully questioned the Forest
Service's science, forever eliminating the perceived
infallibility of Service discretion.20

Furthermore, the

legislation passed during the late I960's and into the
1970's, primarily the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)21 and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)22,
gave interest groups a stronger voice in determining the
,outcome of timber management.
While other agencies have come to grips with the now
politically charged atmosphere of land management, the
Forest Service.has not changed the progressive paradigm.23
Instead it has cobbled together a mixed bag of progressive
science and democratic participation that is mostly

19
See James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulations, and
Environmental Protection, 55 Mont. L. Rev. 425, 428 (1994)
(arguing1that public decisions are, by definition, political
decisions and scientists do not have a special capacity to
chose among competing values).
20

Nelson, supra note 10, at 13.

21

43 U.S.C.A. §4321 et seq.

22

16 U.S.C.A. §1600 et seq.

23

Nelson, supra note 3, at 347-48.
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procedural and unacceptable to most constituents.24
The core standard of interest group government is
simply that a satisfactory political compromise
can be worked out among all the players. At least
in the extreme forms of this political philosophy,
.the substantive result is not really, of concern at
all. Other than the fact that an agreement is
reached, there is no further objective basis for
judging the final outcome because in interest- •
.
group liberalism, all the attention is focused on
the procedure followed.25
An agency attitude has developed that, equates procedural
success with substantive success.26

The final outcome has

■been ah agency that is responsive to the interest group that
amasses the most power and learns to "play the game" 'most
effectively.27
Utilizing science as a management tool is one thing;
having it dictate the ultimate decision is an entirely
different matter.

If humans were motivated solely by

logical science, then scientific management would be an
.acceptable goal.

Instead, they are motivated by an array of

factors: monetary, emotional, ethical and biological.
Distrust, of these external motivators has lead most public
land managers to utilize one tool in achieving the desired
I d. .at 348.
Id.
26
One commentator argues' that the primary challenge
behind implementing ecosystem management is maintaining
substantive integrity without diluting it to a' "mere
procedural device." Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology
and the Law: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 Chi-Kent L.
Rev. 911, 931 (1994).
Nelson, supra note 11, at 348.
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result: command and control regulation:28
In economic terms, the impetus behind command and
control regulation is the failure of a market solution.
*

<

Market failures occur for many reasons: the existence of
negative externalities29, the free rider problem30 and/or
the lack of information.31 Government regulation is an
attempt to internalize these problems and achieve a superior
result.

However, as the level of regulation increases,' so

does the level of bureaucratic control and the resulting
inefficiencies that arise from it.32

B.

The Failure of Centralized Authority

Progressive Era science was a. centralizing vision.33
It was believed that if science could solve the resource
allocation dilemma, then that answer should be applied
uniformly across the country.

Furthermore, only the federal

-28
Huf-fman-, supra note 19, at -426. On a more
theoretical scale, the use of command and control regulation
is also rooted in a distrust of capitalism (the incentive
for -short term profit) that was a corollary to the
Progressive Era. Id.
29
An externality is the uncompensated cost born by a
third party that was not a market participant.
Id. at 427;
Douglas B ’ Rideout and Hayley Hesseln, Principles of Forest
and Environmental Economics 7.9. (1995).
30

Huffman, supra note 19, at 43 0.

31

Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 7.10.

32

Id. at 7..11-7.12.
Nelson, supra note 10, at 13.

government was able to gather the resources and the
expertise necessary to achieve a nationwide application.34
Today, with the myriad of qomprehensive planning
requirements,, the Forest Service is only becoming more
centralized.35

This is.ironic, given the recent trend

toward decentralization among other industries- and
government functions.36

Besides being a very inefficient

and costly structure,37 top down management can create two
significant problems for the Forest Service: interest group
.polarization and the inability to implement ecosystem
management.
When public land decisions originate within a central
authority in Washington, it only tends to exacerbate the
already growing problem of interest group influence.
Because the number of interest groups that compete for
forest resources are too numerous for any one to dominate,
some commentators suggest that actual "agency capture" is
impossible;38

Instead, these commentators explain that the

Forest Service■utilizes a "multiple clientism" approach,
whereby they pit constituents against one another in order

34

Id^.

35

Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.

37

Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 7.12.

38 Randall Q'Toole, Reforming the Forest Service 109
(1988) .

12

to achieve the desired political result.39
This adversarial system of interest group politics
thrives ii> a centralized authority where victory is achieved
by the group that has developed the best political machine.
Eventually, polarization over public land issues results.40
Since the scale of decision is national, the individual
members of the interest groups do not have to account for
thfe on-the-ground impacts to their neighbor.
While the Forest Service is facing the problem of
interest group polarization today, they will inevitably face
another crisis in the future: how to implement adequate
principles of ecosystem management.

Depending on its

interpretation, ecosystem management can either be a
powerful new tool in public.land management or a re-hashed
attempt at Progressive Era science.41 In contrast with
Progressive Era scientific management, ecosystem management
recognizes that scientists do not have complete knowledge of
the interrelated processes that make ecosystems work.42

39

Id^
i

.

40 'Randall O'Toole, Address at the 18th Annual Public
Land Law Conference, Managing America's Public Lands:
Proposals for the Future (October 24, 1996) (conference
notes available from Public Land.& Resources Law Review).
41

Nelson, supra note 3, at 359.

42
Deborah M. Brosnan, Ecosystem Management: An
Ecological Perspective for Environmental Lawyers, 4 U. Balt.
J. Envtl. L. 135, 147-148- (1994); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond
the Boundary Line: Constructing a Laiw of Ecosystem
Management; 65 U. Colo. L. Rev, 293, 322 (1994).

13
Therefore, no one scientific answer exists.

However, the

tension between the political arena and scientific
management is an old issue that will reemerge in
implementing ecosystem management.43
The difference between achieving on-the-ground changes
with ecosystem management or taking another ride on the
merry-go-round of Progressive Era scientific management may
lie in the decentralization of public land management.
Principles, of ecosystem management support an integrated,
organized approach to conservation and land management.44
However, while this a.pprpach may seem to favor centralized,
national management, theorists dismiss implementing
ecosystem management through top down management.

A primary

concept of ecosystem management is that to manage at the
ecosystem level.managers must adopt a spatial and temporal
scale that correlates'to ecological processes.45
The broad aims of conservation biology are to
support the functioning of a world composed of .
semi-autonomous, self-organizing subsystems, which
interact within a nested' hierarchy of larger
systems. By logical extension, an ecosystem
management approach not only tolerates but
endorses a diverse array of semi-autonomous human
43
See Keiter, supra note 42 at 324 (arguing that,
while scientific data is valuable in defining policy
choices, there is no divorcing the underlying social values
from resource allocations).
44
Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The
Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands
in Private' Ownership, 19 Vermont L. Rev. 363., 402 (1995) .
45

Keiter, supra note 2.6, at 929
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organizations--if they operate adaptively within
the parameters of larger ecological systems. In a
world where centralized government programs offer
no easy solutions, the search for institutional
arrangements has turned from unilateral,
monolithic answers, to a consideration' of whether
smaller-scale organizations might, through a
network of voluntary agreements, coordinate and
influence each others' activities "from the bottom
up," instead of awaiting "top-down" national
prescriptions.46
Management should be focused at a level that better equates
individual ecosystems with administrative boundaries.-47
Furthermore, for land managers to implement such a
politically charged management paradigm, it will have to be
sold to local constituents that will bear the costs of'such
an implementation.

Contrary to some observations, local

people have much to contribute to the management of public.
lands..
>

Ecosystem management will only occur if the decision process
is decentralized and not .handed down from an unknown,
bureaucrat in Washington.

C.

The Failure of the Forest Service to Face Economic
Realities

Shrouded in science, the Forest Service has long argued
that, they are immune from the expectations that govern,
private sectors, namely to turn a profit.48

As a

Lee P. Breckenridge, supra note 44, at 4 02.
Nelson, supra note 3, at 3 61.
O'Toole, supra note 38, at 38-39.
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benevolent government entity, the Forest Service's role is
to allocate multiple uses of. the public forests in accord
with utilitarian principles.

For example, the Forest

Service frequently cites their commitment to maintaining
community stability as an excuse for scheduling timber sales
that lose money for the federal treasury.49

However,

timber is not an entitlement; it is a commodity and the
Forest Service's practices must be scrutinized as a business
would be.50

This inefficient result is made even more

maddening when environmental, degradation occurs concurrently
with a net drain to the federal treasury.

Ironically, this

result has made unlikely allies of two very different
interest groups: environmentalists and. economists.51
The most often cited example of economic inefficiency
within the Forest Service is below-cost timber sales.
Recently, the Wilderness Society charged that 1995 timber

49
William E,. Shands and Thomas Waddell, Below Cost
Timber Sales in the Broad Context of National Forest
Management 39 (1988).
50
See- generally O'Toole, supra note '38, at 112'. To
further illustrate the lack of sound business practices
within the Forest Service, Mr. O'Toole provides an analogy
where General Motors applies the same accounting principles
to the automobile industry that the Forest Service applies '
to timber.
Id. at 26-27. The result of such an application
would'be the sales of profitable models subsidizing the
sales of unprofitable models. Id. So long as capital costs
-were not included, a net profit would be realized.on paper.
Id.
Nelson, supra note 3, at 355.
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sales in the United States amounted to a $398 million
loss.52 However, the timber industry hotly contests the
results of such studies.53

This inflammatory rhetoric on

both- sides only serves to cloud the issue and removes belowcost timber sales as a point of reform for the Forest
Service.54
So the first question is: are below-cost timber sales
actually occurring?

Most economic studies55 of timber

sales used a cash flow analysis to determine whether the
■
s

costs of timber sales were exceeding the receipts for a
single year.56

Generally, these studies have, found that,

in the aggregate, receipts from timber sales on national

52
Groups Allege Logging's at a Loss, Missoulian,
February 6, 1997, dt A3.
53

Id.

54
In the cited article above, the Wilderness Society
accuses .industry of picking taxpayer's pockets while the
American Forest & Paper Association accuses the Wilderness
Society of not doing.a '
credible .analysis. Id.
55
Since 1980, comprehensive studies have been
conducted by the/Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Library of Congress, the Wilderness Society, Resources for
the Future, and the General Accounting Office. O'Toole,
supra note 38, at 28-37.
56
Shands and Waddell, supra note 49, at 19. .There
are some inherent problems with analyzing cash flow for
timber saleg because not all receipts are received in a
single year and some
costs, .such as roads, need to be amortized, over the.life of
the road.
Id. Additionally, cash flow, accounting does not.
account for the non-market costs such as aesthetics. Id.

17

forests exceed the costs.57

However, - when sales are

broken down by individual region or individual timber sale,
it is apparent that sales of' high valued old growth timber
are subsidizing the sales of timber with marginal value.58
The General Accounting Office recently found, using an
accounting method that, they helped to design with the Forest
Service, that for fiscal years 1992-1994, timber sale costs
exceeded receipts across the country in every region.59
What causes below-cost timber sales?

Different

commentators have pointed to many problems inherent in the
Forest Service as an explanation.

It is probable that the

real reason for below cost timber sales can be explained by .
a combination of factors.
One of the primary causes identified for below cost

57

Id.

58
Id. at 19-20. However, even this may no longer be.
the case as sales of old growth timber in the northwest have
been significantly curtailed for the protection of spotted
owl habitat. See GAO, Forest ServiceDistribution of
Timber Sales Receipts Fiscal Years- 1992-1994, RCED-95-237FS
(1995) reprinted in Different Drummer, Fall.1995, at 43
(showing a net loss on the federal treasury for regions that
encompass the Pacific Northwest).
59
Id. The GAO included as costs payments to
associated funds, such as the Knutsen-Vandenburg fund, and
25% payments.to the states that are required by law. Id. at
40-42. Many supporters could argue that these payments
serve as a legitimate function of the Forest Service mandate
and serve many functions as community stability that are not
valued.
Shands and Waddell, supra note 49, at 22. In any
event, the net effect on the treasury ■-of the U.S. is
negative.

18

timber sales has been the process of budget maximization.60
Unlike a business that is funded by profits, federal
agencies are funded by tax dollars.61

Budgets are

determined not by results, but by the perceived need and the
satisfaction of powerful interest groups.62

The. larger the,

budget, the more staff that can be hired and the greater
prestige for the .agency.63
The drive for budget maximization is not to suggest
some culpable motive by the Forest Service.64

It is more a

natural outgrowth of federal agencies in general.65
However, decentralizing the top-down management of the
Forest Service and funding the agency out of user profits
would go a long way in eliminating the incentive to sell
timber at below ,cost .66
Another explanation for below-cost timber sales has
been the Service's commitment to promoting a sustained
60
O'Toole, supra note 38, at 104-108; O'Toole, supra
note 40, at 2.
61

O'Toole, supra note 27, at 104.

62
Id. at 104-105. When' studying timber sales, a
Montana State economist found that below-cost timber sales
allow the Forest Service to implement "harvesting activities
across political jurisdictions", thus gaining favor with
multiple legislators that decide the Forest Service Budget.
Id.
63.

Id^_ at 104,

64

Id.

65

Id.

at 107.
107-108.

^

O'Toole, supra note,40, at 2-3.

yield-even flow gf timber to dependent communities.

To

understand the Forest Service's unending drive to achieve
sustained yield, it is necessary to understand the
historical forces that originally prompted the greation of
the Forest Service in the -first place.

Prior to the 1897

Organic Act, industrial loggers practiced what can be
characterized as a "cut-out and get-out" policy.67

Timber

was quickly harvested and the industry moved on to the next
)

merchantable stock;68

This method created the fear of a

timber famine and finally lead to the creation of the timber
reserves, the precursor to the national forests.69

The

method by which community stability would be promoted and a
timber famine averted was known as maintaining a "sustained
yield.1,70
.In--scientific terms, sustained yield is -the point where
the mean annual- increment of stumpage growth is maximized
within a harvest rotation and regulations require that
rotation ages be within 95% culmination of mean annual

67

Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 1.13.

68

Id.

69
Con H. Schallau and Richard M. Alston, The
Commitment to Community Stability: A Policy or Shibboleth?,
17 Envtl. L. 429, 433 (1987).
70
Sustained yield is.defined as "the achievement and
maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular
periodic output of the various renewable resources on the
national forests without the impairment of the productivity
of the land." Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16
U.S.C.A. §531(b) (1990)
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increment.71 This is a biological determination that does
not account for the current market for stumpage or the
capital costs of producing the stand.
■A corollary, to the concept of sustained yield is non
declining even flow.

If the amount of timber that could be

produced was determined at a scientifically sustained level,'
then the Forest Service could also guarantee a certain level
of timber to local, mills and communities.

As required by

federal regulations, the Forest Service must guarantee that
the harvest level of each decade be equal to or greater than
the harvest level of the previous decade.72
If the market for stumpage was constant from year, to
year, a non-declining even flow policy may achieve some of
the goals it is intended to achieve.
market for.stumpage does, not exist.

However, a constant
Therefore, a non

declining even flow policy can only be achieved by either
below cost timber sales (when' supply exceeds demand) or by
forgoing opportunities to sell timber at a profit (when
demand exceeds supply) .73
Non-declining, even flow and sustained yield policies
71
36 C.F.R. §219.16(a)(2)(iii) (1996). Culmination
of mean annual increment is where the average growth of the
■> stand is maximized. Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at
6 .1 0 .

72
36. C.F.R. § 219.16(a) (1) (1996)
It is important
to remember that the rotation age of any particular timber
stand m a y b e fifty years or more.
73
David Wear, et al., Even Flour Timber Harvests and
Community Stability, 87 J. Forestry 24 (1989).

-
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were implemented as a response, to a perceived timber famine
and issues of. community stability.74

However, neither of

these issues are properly addressed by a non-declining, even
flow policy and the continuance of this policy should be '
seriously questioned.
The predicted timber famine of the early 20th century
has failed to materialize.

With current public .opinion and

existing environmental laws/ the cut-out and get-out
policies of the turn of the century timber barons are
forever a thing of the past:

In fact, early implementations

of non-declining even flow were not so much a response to a
timber famine but a timber glut.75

By controlling the

amount of timber on the market with a low sustained yield,
early managers hoped to change the market for stumpage from
a buyers market to a sellers market.75
Community stability is often cited, as a primary goal
of public forest management.77

However, noted forestry

economists have concluded that the relationship between
sustained yield and community stability is nothing more than
"forestry lore", imported along with scientific management

74

Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 5.3.

75 Con H. Schallau, Sustained Yield Versus Community
Stability: An Unfortunate Wedding, 87 J. Forestry 16, 18
(1989) .
76

Id.
Schallau and Alston, supra note 69, at 429-430.
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from Europe.78

An economic analysis of non-declining,

even flow reveals that the policy actually promotes
instability.

The total market for stumpage is comprised of

public and private suppliers.

A non-declining, even flow

policy does not account for the fluctuations of a dynamic
/
market for timber.79 Instead, an inelastic supply of
timber from National Forests is created that ignores price
changes in the market for timber.80

When shocks to the

market for stumpage occur81, the shock is only felt by the
private supplier because of the inelastic supply of timber
from public lands.82 This causes a greater decrease in the
price (and consequently revenues) in the overall market .for
timber than would actually occur if the market shock were
absorbed by both private and public suppliers.83

The end

result is community instability from widely fluctuating
prices.
78
Id. at 444. These economists base their
conclusions on the actual economic implications of sustained
yield and not on any spcial welfare notions.
79 N Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 5.3.
80

Id.

81
An example of an exogenous shock to the market may
be a decrease in demand for timber due to a boycott of
lumber produced from old growth forests. See I d at 3.9 &
3.12.
82
Id. at 5.5-5.8; Thomas R. Waggener, Some economic
implications of Sustained Yield as a Forest Regulation Model
13 (1969) .
83
Rideout and Hesseln, supra note 29, at 5.6-5.8;
Waggener, supra note. 82, at 13-14.,

,

23
In addition to the destabilizing economic implications
t

of a non-declining, even flow policy, many commentators
argue, that community stability should not even be a goal of
forest management.

At a practical'level, community

stability requires the maintenance of the status quo,
resulting in the stagnation of economic growth.84

Indeed,

the earliest attempts, at implementing a sustained yield
cooperative unit failed because the community around which
it was organized actually prospered.85

Furthermore, there,

is evidence that there is a decreasing number of timber
dependent communities because of diversification of local ^
economies.86
D.

Conclusion- Failures of the Forest Service

The inherent problems facing the Forest Service are a
product of the evolution o f .the agency over the past
century.

Some of these problems are indicative of

bureaucracies in general.

'Others are unique to the

experience and founding philosophies of the Forest Service
in particular.

However, because these problems are all

interwoven, no amount of individual exorcising will
84

Waggener, supra note 82, at 17.

85
Schallau, supra note 75, at 2 0 (examining the
experience of the Shelton cooperative unit).
86
Shands and Waddell, supra note 49, at 40. For
example, by diversifying their economy, the infamous Oregon
community ..of Sweet Home is beginning to bounce back from the
shut down of lumber mills from'spotted owl litigation. John
G. Mitchell, In the Line of Fire: Our National Forests, .
National Geographic, March 1997, at 82.
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significantly reform the Forest Service... Therefore it is
■necessary that a fundamental paradigmatic shift be made in
the Forest Service to send a clear mandate to the agency as
to how our public timber resources are managed.

III., State Trust Management

The Forest Service is not the only game in town.

In

the west, nearly forty-one million acres of land is managed
by the states as part of their school land grants.87

Not.

all of these lands are primarily valuable for timber.

In

New Mexico and Wyoming, school grant lands are- very valuable
for mineral deposits.88

However, in Washington, Oregon

and Idaho, state trust, forests produce large revenues for
the state's permanent fund.89 Additionally, these lands
have very high recreational value, especially when they
border high density visitor areas like Grand Teton National
Park.90

In addition to the economic value of these lands,

state trust lands are also home to areas with high'
environmental values due to endangered species habitat or

87

Fairfax et al., supra note 5, at 832.

88
Melinda Bruce and Teresa Rice, Controlling the
Blue Rash: Issues and Trends in State Land Management, 29
Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 8. Mineral and oil and gas
royalties on these lands produce about 175 million for both
states..
89
Id. at 9. For Washington alone, 1990 timber
revenues were $225 million.
90

Id*, at 11.
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other unique attributes.91
A.
Management

Trust Principles in the Context of Public Land

I will argue that a general trust management scheme
would be beneficial to forest management, not that state
trust management' should be extended to include national
forests.

Therefore the;historical evolution of state trust

land management is not as important as an understanding of
!

'

the interplay that trust principals have on on-the-ground
management.92
Imposing a trust on the managers of public lands
elevates .the manager's responsibility to that of a
fiduciary.93 The trustee must manage the trust fpr the
benefit of a,described beneficiary class following certain
prescribed rules and duties, among them: the duty to
exercise skill and prudence in caring for the.trust, the
duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries, the duty to
disclose, the duty to protect and preserve trust property.,
and the duty, to make the trust productive.?4
Some of these duties are conflicting and require
91

JjL. at 12.

92
In any event, the history of the land grant
program and the resulting school trust lands have been
exhaustively examined elsewhere. See Fairfax, et al., supra
note 5, at 803-841 (1992).
93

Id. at 851.
Id. at 851-852.
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careful balancing on the part of the trustee.

For the

purposes of land management, the duties that are most
important are the duty to preserve the trust and the duty to '
make the trust productive.

In trust law, when these two

duties conflict a trustee must act as a "prudent investor"
would.
Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of
the trust or by statute, the trustees are under a
duty to make such investments as a prudent man
would make of his own property having primarily in
view the preservation of the trust estate and the‘
amount and regularity of income to be derived.95
This rule has since been modified somewhat by the
Restatement and renamed as the "unconstrained" Prudent
Investor rule.96

This rule states that the trustee must

manage trust assets' as a prudent investor would taking into
account the context of the individual investment in relation
to the trust portfolio as a whole.97

For the most part,

courts have only taken into account one side of the
equation: current income .for the trust.98

However, if the

beneficiary class is expanded and courts becpme more aware
of the competing nature of uses, the application of the

95 •IVA William F. Fratcher , -Scott on Trusts §389
(1989). This is the same rule regardless of whether it is a
charitable or private trust.
96
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227(a); Tacy
Bowlin, Rethinking the ABC's of Utah's School Trust Lands,
1994 Utah L. Rev. 923, 948 (1994).
97

Bowlin, supra note 96, at 948..
See Id. at 943-55.
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)
prudent investor rule could become a beneficial mandate for
.

public land management.

B.

How the Trust has been Treated by the Courts.

Despite the very different enabling acts and
constitutions that established state trust lands,'the courts
have treated the trust relationship relatively the same from
state to state."

This is because early Supreme Court

cases addressing the trust relationship came from Arizona
and New Mexico and these cases have, in turn, been cited as
precedent in state courts.100 While this mistake of
history has been a., source of criticism for some
commentators,101 it is also a point of commonality which
makes the jurisprudence in this legal area comparable across
state borders. .
Two common threads seem to generally line cases in the
state trust context.102

State trust managers are both '

trustees, with a higher standard of care, and bureaucrats
that are traditionally afforded some degree of discretion.

99

Fairfax et al., supra note 5, at 842.

100
Id. at 843; See e.g. Lassen v. Arizona. 385 U.S.
458- (1966). The enabling acts for the individual state
school trust lands were all very different from one another.
However, by citing these Supreme Court cases, state.courts
have imported Arizona's and New Mexico's enabling acts into
the state's common law.
101

See Bowlin, supra note 96, at 930-931.
Fairfax et al ., supra note 5, at 848.
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In the.vast majority of cases, the issue could be framed as
a dispute over how the lessee works the land.

If the

challenger to the state's authority is a lessee, court's
have accorded the trustee discretion in how the land is
managed.103 However, if the challenger is a beneficiary,
stricter notions of trust law are imputed to the
trustee.104
Because most challenges brought by the beneficiary^
centered on the disposition of ,trust assets for less than
full value by the trustee, the cases tend to emphasize
income maximization as the dominant duty of the trust.105
For example, in State v. University of Alaska106, the state
included trust lands within state park boundaries without
compensating the trust.

The

lands within the1park placed

court heldthat including

the

unconstitutional restrictions

on the ability of the lands to produce income for the
beneficiary-university.107

The duty of the state with

regard to the lands was to maximize the economic return to
103

Id. at 848-849.

104,

Id. at 849.

105
However, if "the issue involves the misuse of trust
lands by a lessee, courts have had little difficulty
upholding a decision by the trustee to prevent the
destruction of trust assets under the guise of income
maximization. See Winchell v. Dent of State Lands. 785 P.2d
212, 216 (Mont. 1990) (overgrazing of state land by lessee
necessitates cancellation of lease).
106

624 P.2d 807, 809-810 (Alaska 1981).

107

icL_ at 813 .
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the beneficiary.108
These cases have fed the fears that" many
environmentalists have with state management. When the
duties of making the trust productive and the duties of
preserving the trust conflict, most critics of trust
management feel that courts will only uphold the alternative
that maximizes current income for the schools'.109 While
there is some evidence for this sentiment in court opinions,
the full scope of the trust model should instill confidence
in'many environmentalists..

Recent decisions in the state

trust context have included language that includes the
competing duty of the trustee to preserve the trust.
To- begin with, the heightened duty imposed on trustees
by the courts eliminate many of the current problems found
within current Forest Service management.

The duty of

loyalty would virtually eliminate subsidized resources given
away to extractive industries.110

Furthermore, trusts are

typically-self-sustaining and not dependant on the budget

108

Id.

109

Bowlin, supra note 96, at 939-940.

110■. See Oklahoma Education Assoc, v. Nigh. 642 P.2d
230, 236 (Okl. 1982) (use of school trust lands to subsidize
farming and ranching is a breach of the trust); County of
Skamania v. Washington. 685 P .2d 576 (Wash. 1984) (use of
school trust lands to subsidize timber industry is-a breach
of the trust).

30
appropriations whims of •Congress.111

Therefore, the

;

incentive to allocate .trust resources in. an environmentally
damaging way is minimized.
These issues are well settled with courts and are a
function of'the trust paradigm itself.

They did not require

the active representation of environmental interests to
achieve an environmentally; friendly result.

The duty to

maximize income- did not conflict with preservation of the
trust corpus.

However; as these duties begin to conflict,

courts are beginning to grapple with the emerging knowledge
that short term economic returns are not always the most
prudent course of action for the trust.
One possible explanation for the unequal emphasis on
the duty to maximize,income can be found in standing.
Strictly construed, environmental groups do not have
standing to challenge trustee actions unless they are a
lessee.112

The school districts, not the parents of

individual school children serve' as the representatives for

111
Jon A. Souder, Sally K. Fairfax, & Larry Ruth, ,
Sustainable Resources Management and State School Lands: The
Quest for Guiding Principles, 34 Nat. Resources J. 2 71 , 292
(1994); Moon v. State Board of Land Commissioners. 724 P.2d
125', 129 (Idaho 1986) (use of ten percent of trust, revenues
for maintenance of trust do not constitute a. breach of the
trust).
.
112
Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc. Inc. v.. State, 899
P.2d 949, 952 (Idaho 1995). However, these groups have been
successful' in challenging trustee decisions, based on other
grounds such as public trust doctrine, Id. at .955, or under
unique state doctrines, National Parks and Conservation
Assoc, v. Board of State Lands. 869 P.2d 909, 913 (1993).
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the beneficiary.113

Without anyone asserting an interest

in conserving the corpus of the trust over production.of
income, the court's have had little opportunity to develop a
jurisprudence to address these conflicting duties.
However, in National Parks and Conservation
Association114, the Utah Supreme' Court was squarely faced
with a direct conflict between the duty to preserve the
trust and the duty to produce maximum income.

In that case,

f

environmental- groups sought to challenge the decision by the
Utah Board of State Lands to exchange trust lands within a
national park for county lands.115 - The county intended to
pave a road running through the trust lands for greater
tourist access to the surrounding area.116

The NPCA

challenged the exchange on the grounds that, the Board
determined that it could not "give preference to scenic,
aesthetic, or recreational values over income maximization
in managing school trust lands."117

The Court upheld the

Board's determination holding that the trust was not created
for the general welfare of the people.118
113

Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc.. 899 P.2d at 952..

114

869 P.2d at 909.

•15. icL at

911.

116

IdL at

911.

117

Id. at

916.

118
Id. at 919'. The Court went on to specifically
deny that the.enabling act created a public trust instead of
the traditional private trust.
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While the holding in National Parks and Conservation
Association has been criticized11-9, the Court in dicta
began the long road to reconciling the conflicting trust
duties of income maximization and preservation of the trust.
Specifically the Court held that long term income potential
must not be sacrificed for short term profits-.120
Furthermore, where possible, income production must be
accomplished so as. not to sacrifice unique scenic or
cultural values.121
Nat-ional Parks and Conservation Association upholds the
traditional notion of income production of state .trust lands
while recognizing the merit of preserving the corpus of the
trust.

However,' as the Court in that case also recognized,

trust management must be accomplished within the confines of
existing law.122

Therefore, if other statutes mandate that

environmental values are to be protected, then trust
management must conform to those values.123
119

See Bowlin, supra note 96, at 934-045.

120 National Parks and Conservation Assoc. . 869 P.2d
at 921. 121
Id. However, the court went on to hold that, in
the. final analysis, state lands must be income productive.
If that would cause a' complete loss of aesthetic value, then
the trustee'should attempt to exchange the land for more
productive lands.
Id.
122

isL at 920.

123 However, because the origins
arise from state constitutions, these
constitutional if they are to provide
duty to produce income. See Board of

of state trust lands
laws must be
limitations to the
Natural Resources v.
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In Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners v.
Colorado Mined Land. Reclamation Board124, the Conda Mining
Co. sought a permit to expand its mining operations on'
school trust land.

Obviously, this expansion would have

maximized the amount of income the lands were producing for
•the trust.

However, because of local zoning regulations

designed to protect the wildlife and character of the
community, Conda was denied a permit to expand its mine.125
Conda sought a declaratory judgement that counties could not
constitutionally exercise zoning authority over school trust
lands.126

The Court disagreed with Conda holding that

[T]he State Land Board "must first look to the
statutes ascertain the regulations prescribed, and
then, in exercising their constitutional powers,
they must so act as in the judgement.of the board
will secure the maximum amount, under the
prescribed regulations." . . . The constitutional
scheme does not contemplate that the State Land
Board can ignore a reasonable legislative
regulation for the purpose of carrying out its
constitutional responsibility of securing "the
maximum amount possible" for public lands."127
A similar case arose in Montana where an environmental
organization sued the trustee for failing to complete an

Brown,, w a i .zd u /, 943 (9th Cir. 1993) (law designed to
conserve forests by banning timber exports from state
forests is constitutional despite large economic loss to
■school.trust) .
124

809 P.2d 974, 978 ('Col.1991).

125

Id. at 978.

126

Id^_ at 985. .

127

Id.
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environmental impact statement before modifying a grazing
lease on trust land.128

The lessee wished to change his

lease in order to graze domestic sheep instead of cattle in
an area adjacent to a bighorn sheep range.129

The trustee

argued, inter alia, that its ability to deny a lease based
on environmental concerns is limited by its duty to maximize
income for the trust.130

The Court held that while income

maximization is a consideration of the trustee, it is not ,
the oniy consideration.131
MEPA requires that ^an agency be informed when it
balances preservation against utilization of our
natural resources and trust lands.. The DSL may
not, as here reach a decision without first
engaging in the requisite significant impacts
analysis.132
These two cases illustrate that the trustee's duty to
maximize income for the benefit of the current beneficiary
is not a loophole for trustees to avoid environmental
protections that other land managers also have to comply
with.
It is unfortunate that the duty to make the trust

128
Ravalli Countv Fish & Game Assoc. . Inc. v. Montana
Department of' State Lands.. 903 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Mont. 1995).
129

Id. at 1365-66.

130
Id. at 1370. However, the real issue in this case
was not whether DSL could modify the lease, but whether they
could modify the lease without first examining the
environmental impacts of- the modification.
Id.
131

Id.

132

Id. at 1371.

productive has received top billing in court opinions
because it has led to a general mistrust of state -management
by environmentalists.

In theory, the challenge of the

trustee is to balance the duties of income production and
preservation of the trust. . As the preservation interests
become represented more often in lawsuits and the economic
potential of scenic beauty and recreation are increasingly
recognized, this balance should be restored to the
management perspective.

As a lowest common denominator,'the

duty to make the trust productive does not suspend the
trustee's responsibility to comply with existing
environmental protection laws, assuming those laws are
constitutional.

C.

Possible Benefits of Trust Management
over Current Federal Management

Managing public lands as a trust requires that the
entire paradigm of current management be abandoned.

Section

II outlines many of the fundamental problems with the
current Forest Service paradigm.

By shifting, management to.

a trust paradigm, the unclear and conflicting mandates of
Progressive Era science could be achieved.133

Instead of

1,33
It
is
impracticable
to
assume
that
no
"Progressively"
trained foresters will be employed as
trustees. Indeed* current Forest Service employees still have
much to offer to resource management.
The current problems
found in national forest service management is more a problem
with the overall centralized system than with individual
Forest Service employees.

controlling the equation, science would be one tool that
managers will use to determine how to best fulfill their
duties as trustee for the resource.
Infusing trust principles that have a well established
common law has caused state land managers to accept four
characteristics of trustee management: clarity,
accountability, enforceability, and perpetuity.134

Each of

these characteristics could have enormous positive impact on
future forest management..

Furthermore,.trust principles

foster economic efficiency while also facilitating ,the shift
to ecosystem management.
Unlike ambiguous multiple use mandates, trust
principles are relatively clear where lands are managed to
meet specific goals for' named beneficiaries.135

As

management objectives become more blurred as demands on the
resource becomes greater, clarity in mandates are going to
be critical in preventing mismanagement.

As some

commentators explained, " [c] larity, we. assert permits- tying
resource management tq the achievement of objectives.

This

linkage is particularly crucial when dealing with,
potentially imprecise concepts such as sustainability. "136'
Trustees are accountable to the beneficiaries through
clearly measurable goals, the duty to disclose, and the duty
134

Souder, et al., supra, note 111, at 278-279.
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of .undivided loyalty.137

In particular, accountability

makes it very difficult to divert trust assets for the
benefit of the manager so as to maximize budgets.

An

examination of the allocation of personnel and resources to
particular management prescriptions on state lands revealed
that beneficiaries can identify and force trustees to manage
lands in the most economically efficient manner.138
Furthermore, if budgets are tied to actual revenues, and not
state legislatures, sustainable management is possible.139
Trust accountability would go a long way in eliminating the
economic inefficiencies in current.Forest Service
management.

This concept of accountability makes, it a

breach of- the trust to allow the use of trust assets to
subsidize users.

Below cost timber■sales in the name of

community stability would be inconsistent with trust
principles, unless the communityAwas a direct beneficiary of
the trust.
.Of all of the characteristics of trust management,
enforceability is the most well established.

Countless ,

cases have developed a common law that is fairly analogous

137

Id. at 286.
*

138

IcL.' at 286-290.

139 Id. at 292. Western trust lands budgets are
typically funded in-one of three, ways: 1). determination
politically by the legislature; 2) ,a fixed, predetermined
percentage of revenues; and 3) no fixed budget, where costs
are directly deducted from revenues and the remainder given
to the beneficiaries.

to resource management issues.140 As public interest
groups are beginning t<p assert more of a stake in state land
management issues, these standards are evolving as well to
accept more contemporary notions of preservation.141

When

weighing alternatives in the natural resource context,
courts treat trustees with less deference than the would
normally be given to public land administrators, thus making
judicial enforceability more1of a reality in the trust
:paradigm than in the current agency context.142
Perpetuity directly reflects the conflicting trust
duties of maintaining the trust assets and producing income
for the current beneficiaries.

Some commentators argue that

,this conflict has given rise to a conservative management
style.143

This notion of a direct relationship between

"perpetual revenue production" and "perpetual capacity of
lands to produce" provides strong tools for larid managers to
avoid special interests that would like to see short term
revenue production maximized.144
Another primary benefit to a trust management regime
would be the creation of incentives to manage forests for
economic efficiency. ", In a side by side comparison/ state
140'
141
142

Idj_ at 2 93 .
See Section IIIB, above.
Souder et al., supra note 111, at 295.
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forests fair much better economically than national forests.
In a study by the Political Economy Research Center (PERC).,
state forests in Montana generated a $ 13.3 million return
-while national forests in Montana yielded a loss of $42
million.145

The reason for this disparity is that state

forests are managed more efficiently for both costs and '
revenues.

State forests in Montana spend two and a half

times less money than the nearby Gallatin National Forest
spends in preparing timber sales..146

From 1978-1983, state

forests in Montana received much higher revenues for timber
sold.147

These dramatic economic differences were not

145
Donald R. Leal, PERC Policy Series: Turning a
Profit on Public Forests 4-5 (1995). This is despite the
fact that twenty /times the timber was harvested on national
forests than on state forests.
146 Id. at 8. This difference can not be explained by
a lower burden of* environmental review by state agencies.
Most states have some version of NEPA that requires the
trustee to perform a similar level of, environmental review.
See Ravalli County Fish & Game Assoc., Inc., 903 P.2d at
1371. . One commentator has demonstrated that some states, at
least in the short run, are very efficient at allocating
personnel to projects that receive the highest margin of
return. Souder et al at 288-289.
147
Leal, supra note 145, at 10-11; David H. Jackson,
Why Stumpage Prices Differ Between Ownerships: A Statistical
Examination of State and Forest Service Sales in Montana, 18
Forest Ecology and Management 219 (1987). Professor Jackson
offers two -explanations for this disparity. First, the
Forest Service primarily employs clear cutting, resulting in
both high and low value timber harvested. However, the
state employs more selective cutting, harvesting only high
value timber. Second, because the Forest Service timber
sales are so high in volume, more capital costs, such as
road construction, have to be incurred and bids are lower
than competing state sales. Recent studies indicate that
the Forest Service may have corrected for some of these
problems because average stumpage prices in 1993 between the
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achieved at the price of environmental quality either.

A.

1992 study found that logging practices -employed on state
forests protected the watershed better than logging
practices on national forest land.148
While not a perfect fit, individual forest trusts could
also facilitate the procedural shift to ecosystem
management.

Three dominant themes must be embraced by land

managers utilizing ecosystem management: 1) boundaries" must
coincide with ecological processes, not politics, 2)
scientific uncertainty must be accepted, and 3). governance
of the ecosystem must not be ad hoc through a multitude of
agencies.149

A trust would be able to embody these themes

better than the current hodge podge of federal and state
agencies.150

Trust boundaries could easily coincide with

state and national forests were nearly equal.
note 14 5, at 11.

Leal, supra

148Leal, supra note 145,
at 11. This, is not to
suggest
that stateforests aremore ecologically healthy
than national forests. Because state forests are so
disjointed, it is doubtful even that they enjoy a large
amount of biodiversity. 'However, the study does serve to
illustrate that economic efficiency can be achieved without
wholesale disregard of the environment.
149
Thomas T. Ankerson & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem
Management and the Everglades: A Legal and Institutional
Analysis, 11 J. Land U s e & Envtl L. 473, 475-476 (1996)..
150
Ecosystem management is currently being pursued
'
through both "hard management", where one agency manages an
entire ecosystem, and "soft management" where management is
accomplished through multiple agencies cooperating.
Id. at
502. A single, managing authority will eliminate conflicting
mandates that can stall soft management.
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individual watersheds.151
To implement ecosystem management, the prudent investor
rule would have to be reconciled with the concept of
scientific uncertainty.-

However, the trust concept does not

presuppose perfect knowledge. In fact, trusts by nature are
conservative and not entrepreneurial institutions.

This

would lead to management that generally embraces a
"precautionary principle" where managers would act to ensure
that environmental harm does not occur.152

In trust

language, the trustee must act to insure that the corpus of
the trust is protected.

These two principles are actually

■ closely related.
Despite these, possible benefits of trust management,
there are some deep criticisms of trust management.

Most of

these criticisms center on the "income maximization"
principles currently recognized'by the courts in regard to
school trusts.153

However, there is really no. reason for

151 Id. at 476-479. The problem with defining an
appropriate scale for ecosystem management is that no
spatial level will adequately cover all species.
Id. at
478. Larger ecosystem units (sometimes called "greater
ecosystems) that span many watersheds will fall into the
same overcentralization problem that plagues the current
forest service. Therefore, it.is best to limit trusts to
watersheds, the ecosystem unit suggested by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service.
152 Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the
Precautionary Principle, Environment, Sept. 1991, at 4.
153
Steve Alder, Some Pitfalls with Government Land
Trusts, Different Drummer, Fall 1995, at 47; John Arum, Old
Growth Forests on School Lands- Dedicated to Oblivion?Private Trust Theory and the Public Trust, 65 Wash. L. Rev.

environmentalists to shy away from the trust concept in
regards to land management.

The principle of the trustee as

a "prudent investor" will ensure sustainable development of
public lands in. perpetuity.

Courts, in examining state

trust management, are beginning to reconcile the competing
trust duties of managers as the income maximization
principle is slowly eroding.

Furthermore, the creation of

federal forest trusts does not have to be governed by the
same principles currently found in the enabling acts, for
state school trusts.

In fact, these critics acknowledge

that trusts could be created that provide better protection
for wilderness values.154

IV.

Creating a Federal Forest Trust.

Constructing a trust manaigement paradigm is as simple
and'as■complicated as reinventing the Forest. Service. ,The
only available model for such a large scale land trust is
the states.

However, there are many pitfalls in the

evolution of the State lands program and also many
dissatisfied users of these state lands.
/

Therefore, a
'

wholesale adoption of the .state program is not practicable
and many improvements of the state paradigm can be made if
such a trust system was to be implemented.

As a departure

for this analysis, I will utilize the "National Forest
151 (1990) .
154

Alder, supra note 153, at 47-48.

Reform Proposal" offered by the Thoreau Institute as a' model
for implementing a trust paradigm on federal forest
management.155
A.

Requirements of a Trust

Generally, in' order to create a trust, there must be 1)
a manifest intent to create a trust, 156 2) some trust
property, 157 3 ) some trust purpose, 158 4) a
beneficiary,159 and 5) must, be in writing in some form to
satisfy the statute of frauds.160

Based on established

common law in the context of state school trust lands,161
there can be little doubt that a national forest trust can
be created.

Any bill that creates a trust would have to

intend to do so, however no particular language is necessary
to manifest that intent.162 A trust can be created for any
purpose that is not illegal.163 Any national forest trust

155
Reprinted in Different Drummer, -Fall 1.995, at 4446. The edited version, hereinafter the National Forest
Trust Act, is included as Appendix I.
156

Restatement

157

IcL at §66.

158

Id. at §59.

159

(Third)

of Trusts §23.

IcL. at §66 .

160

IcL. at §40.

161

Fairfax et al., supra note 5, at 850-91.,

162
Restatement (Third) of Trusts
Forest Reform Act §4 (e), below.
163

Restatement

(Third)

§24;

of Trusts §59.

See National
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would be created for the purpose of ensuring that the
national forests were managed in the most economically
efficient manner while protecting the environmental
quality.164

The trust property, the' national forests, and

the writing requirements are also easily identified.
By far the most problematic aspect of creating a trust
is naming a beneficiary.

The primary requirement of naming

a beneficiary is that it is definitively ascertainable.165
Given that, in theory., national forests belong to every
citizen of the United States, managing lands "in trust for
the people of the United States" may at first seem an
-appropriate beneficiary. However, it would be ill advised to
have such an inclusive beneficiary for a number of reasons.
First, the beneficiary class should not be so large as
to encompass too many people,. For a trustee to manage the
forests in trust for a beneficiary class with many competing
needs would sacrifice the clarity of the trust mandates.

It

would be very difficult for a trustee to ascertain and
balance the competing needs.166

Standing to seek redress

for trustee decisions would be granted to a very large group
of plaintiffs.
164

See National Forest Reform Act §2, below.

165

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 112.

166
Conflicting mandates are actually a problem that
current public land managers, face.
James Brown, The Forest
Service Needs a Clear Mandate, Different D r u m m e r F a l l 1995,
at 31.

Second, use of the phrase "in trust for the people of
the United States" denotes the public trust doctrine.167
There are, considerable differences between public trust
doctrine and private trusts and the two should not be
confused.

While the public trust doctrine has provided a

successful theory on which to provide some protection for
natural resources168-, it is not expansive enough to provide
guidance in the national forest context.* The public trust
doctrine, while it has expanded in recent years to include
other resources169, it has mostly been limited to resources
with some nexus to navigable waters.

Therefore^ there is no

established precedent to apply to the multitude of resources
that make up the corpus of the trust.

Second, while the

public trust doctrine has received increasing support from
courts170, there are many commentators that predict its
demise.171

Basing a reform of the Forest Service on a less

167
For example,
constitution provides
to' the state are held
Wash. Const, art XVI,.

Article XVI of the Washington state
that " [a]11 the public lands granted
in trust for all of the people."
§ 1.

168
See National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of
Alpine County. 658 P. 2d 709. (Calif. 1983) (the Mono Lake
litigation).
169
See Wade v . Kraemer. 459 N.E.2d
.1984)(applying the doctrine to wildlife).
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(111.

170
George A. Gould and Douglas L. Grant, Water Law 510,
note 1 (1995). •
171
therein.

Id. ’at 511-512,

note 3 and the references cited
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than solid legal doctrine is inadvisable.172
Of course this begs the question: who should be the
beneficiary?

However, no hard and, fast answers emerge.

The.

beneficiary class should be limited.enough so that actual
measurable objectives can be formulated and loyalty to the
beneficiary is not expanded to the point that it has little
meaning.

A preference for local beneficiaries over national

ones could also be advantageous as a method to decentralize
management and account more for the costs of management
decisions on local constituencies.

However, this would

necessitate people to -recognize that "public lands" do not
mean what they once did.173
For lack of a clear choice, I recommend-adopting the
same beneficiary as the states- the public schools.

This

would limit the beneficiary to a class of people that have"
both short term and long term needs of the trust.

Balancing

competing trustee duties would be easier and mandates would
remain clear.

Generally, public schools do not have an

immediate, direct stake in land management decisions as
compared to industry or environmentalists.

Furthermore, a

common law defining the scope' of the beneficiary already .
exists.

A portion of national forest revenues in the

172 ' Private trust theory, however,, has an established
common law and is widely accepted.
173
Instituting a preference for local beneficiaries
over national ones would probably cause a larger outcry than
is actually deserved and represents the unwillingness for
special interests to give up any "turf" that they control.
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federal treasury aiready are allocated to public education.
Naming public schools as the beneficiary would only
eliminate the "middle man" of congressional appropriations
and ease the burden on states.174
The question of who will be the beneficiary of a
national forest trust will be the focus of considerable
debate and likely stall any attempts to apply trust
principles to forest management for some time.

While the

public schools as a beneficiary could be a compromise, it is
not the only possibility. .However,' any attempts to further,
define the beneficiary class in the future should take great
care to avoid the problems with an over-expansive
beneficiary class outlined above.
B.

The National Forest Trust Act

In order to incorporate the issues outlined above,
significant changes were made to the Thoreau Institute
model.

However, the general purpose of creating a national

forest trust,, "to ensure that the Nation's renewable forest
and rangeland resources be managed so as to provide the
greatest economic efficiency, environmental quality, and
responsiveness to public demand", is the same for both
models.
Sections 1 through 3 of the National Forest Trust Act

174
While definitely an argument against naming public
schools as the beneficiary, the relative merit of public
funding of education is beyond the scope of this paper.

48

are self explanatory and do not require elaboration.
Beginning with Section 4- the Act is makes substantive .
changes.

Section 4(a) provides that the Secretary of

Agriculture redraw national forest boundaries to approximate
the boundaries of watersheds.
The Thoreau Bill originally divides land into Forest Trusts
and Wilderness Trusts and divides their management
accordingly.175

For the purposes of this revision, I

have included wilderness lands in the National Forest Units
in an attempt to maintain the integrity of a watershed and
provide continuity in management.
The Thoreau Bill also, provided no guidance for drawing
boundaries besides limiting the units to between one to, six
million acres in size.176

This subsection

mandates that

boundaries be based on individual watersheds, more
approximating an appropriate scales for effective ecosystem
management.

By allowing the boundaries to be redrawn with

no regard to political boundaries, this clause would create
National Forest units that spread across more than one
state.

This may cause some difficulty in determining which

state trust law to apply to each individual unit.

However,

the federal courts can easily develop a federal common law •
with regard to National Forest Units.

Additionally, because

of cases such as Lassen, much of the individual state
175

Thoreau Institute, supra, note 155, at 44.

176 , Id.
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precedent- is already very similar.177
In order to provide some continuity of management while
individual trust units are drawn, section 4, subsection b,
allows the -secretary to name an interim supervisor for each
unit.

The interim supervisor will be responsible for

arranging the members of the forest trust to\elect a
governing board.
Section 4, subsection c creates.the trust responsible
for managing the trust, subject to defined principles.

This

subsection allows for any citizen of the United States to
become a member of the trust for a nominal fee.
is identical to the Thoreau model.

This clause

By- allowing anyone to

become a member of the trust, it expands the class of
potential plaintiffs and diminishes the standing problems at
issue in Selkirk-Priest Basin Association.178

However, the

ability .of any one plaintiff to sue the trust would be
governed by corporate .law and stockholder rights.
Section 4, subsection e is mandates that the national
forest units be managed in trust for the public schools of
the United States.

The Thoreau model originally states that

the National Forest Units will be held "in trust for the
people of the United States." 179

This language actually

creates a. "public trust" with the possible difficulties
_________

177

See note 100.

178

8 99’ P. 2d at 952 ,

179

Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 45.''
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explained above.180

Limiting the beneficiary class to the

public schools creates a private charitable trust with an
established,common law.
This subsection also mandates that management shall be
in accordance with established trust principles, ecosystem
management, and established federal law.

The original

Thoreau model stated that management "shall be in accordance
with accepted multiple use and sustained yield principles,
and shall b,e aimed at producing the greatest good for the
greatest number for the longest period of time."181

This

language would only serve to further entrench the .
established theories of Progressive science by grounding
them in law.

Inserting language that places the emphasizes-

the trustees duties provides a clean legal break with
Progressive Era notions.

Furthermore, the competing duties

.of making the trust productive and preserving the corpus of
the trust are given equal weight in this language,
eliminating the authority for one sided judicial
interpretations focusing on "maximization of income."

While

this subsection also mandates that principles of ecosystem
■management be utilized in managing the trust.

However, it

does not mandate.any substantive result.
As already established by current trust law, trust
management must comply with current environmental protection
■ 180
181

See section IVA, above.
Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 45.
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laws.182
Section.4, subsection'f outlines the powers given to
the board.

These powers included the ability hire and fire

trust personnel, including the supervisor, the power to
approve an operating plan, and the power to set membership
fees.

Subsection g allows the board to set fees to use

forest units at market value.

This provision is crucial if

a market for alternative uses of the National Forest Unit is
to be recognized.

User fees for recreation and other non

consumptive activities will make it possible for a trustee
to make the trust productive for the beneficiary while also
preserving the corpus'of the trust.
Disposal of the trust corpus is forbidden by section 4,
subsection h.

However, the board can exchange'land of equal

value if the exchange will ease the management of the trust.
Also, the board can approve a land acquisition in order to.
make the trust more valuable both economically and
ecologically.

Habitat fragmentation has been identified as

one of the greatest threats to biodiversity worldwide.183
This clause was inserted to enable the Board of Trustees to
actively pursue the acquisition of lands that- are part of
the ecosystem they are managing, but outside the current

182
See Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners.
809 P.2d at 985; Ravalli County Fish & Game Assoc'. . 903 P.2d
at 1370.
•■\
183 Reed F. Noss and Allen Y. Cooperrider, Saving
Nature's Legacy 51 (1994).
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boundaries of the

National Forest Unit in order toconnect

habitats that are

fragmented.

Section 4, subsection j gives the power to revoke the
charter of any forest trust to the federal judiciary.
Thoreau model gave this power to Congress.184
v

'

The

This clause

-

was changed, giving this power to the judicial branch, for
two reasons.
desires

First, Congress is very accommodating of the

of individual interest groups and placing this .

power with them may not be wise.

Utilization of this power

could be,inconsistent depending on the perceived needs of a.
constituency and the desire of a politician to be reelected.
Second, unless the National Forest Trust Act was grounded in
the Cpnstitution,

it is .unclear

could be obtained

for Congress' notions of "gross

malfeasance".

what kind of judicialreview

However, an established chain of appeals is

provided by giving this power to the' judicial branch.
Section 4, subsection k states that if the unit is
unable to sustain itself, the board of trustees may transfer
the lands in the trust to jurisdiction of another trust
willing to undertake its management.

This would occur when

l

a trust is created that has only marginal sustainable
economic value.

While this subsection may break up

ecosystems, the trust must first be self sustaining in order
to provide adequate management.
Section 5 controls the budgeting and financing of the
184

Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 44.

individual units.

In order to escape the budget

maximization problems afflicting the current Forest Service,■
•

•

•

•

.

G

it is crucial that units are only financed out of revenues
and donations that they generate.

Subsection .b provides fpr

start-up funds for each of the National Forest Units,
Because the units would be decentralized, no money for an
overriding management bureaucracy will be needed.

For the

-first year, this administrative allocation is redistributed
to National Forest Units to alleviate the incentive to
immediately sell high-value timber, such as old growth, to
make the trust self-sustaining.
Section 5, subsection c lists how the receipts
generated by the units are to be distributed amongst the
beneficiary and the management of the unit.

Another

recipient, the biodiversity trust fund, also receives twenty
percent of the gross receipts.
While the purpose of a biodiversity trust fund is explained
in more detail below, by funding the biodiversity trust with •
receipts from the trust at an equal level .as receipts paid
to the states in supiport of public schools, biodiversity and
ecological integrity are raised to a "quasi-beneficiary"
level, providing greater protection for species.
The rest of section 5 is designed to eliminate many of
£>
the economic disincentives that are currently found in the
Forest Service..

Subsection e

specifically eliminates the

incentive of managers to maximize their budget by promoting

the uses of resources that curry favor with legislators that
control their budgets.

Instead, their budgets are tied to

the actual productivity of the land they manage and the
costs incurred in managing it.,

Subsection f rewards

sustainable and efficient management.

Instead of managers

utilizing a "use it or lose it" budgetary framework, they
can employ a more conservative approach and bank resources
until they are actually needed.

Subsection h liquidates '

funds, that have been held in trust and distributes them to
the appropriate Unit.

For example, under the Knutson-

Vandenberg Act about 25% of timber receipts for fiscal years
1992-1994 were retained^ for reforestation activities.185
Elimination of these funds will further decentralize the
units and break their dependence on Congressional
appropriations.
Section 6 expressly provides for the use of
conservation easements in order to preserve natural
resources and biodiversity.

The sale of conservation

easements creates a market where "existence" value (the
Value of just knowing the resource exists) and other nonmarket values can compete with market values.

Any entity

can purchase a conservation easement and the decision
whether to sell a conservation easement must be given equal
I

weight.by the board of trustees as resource uses.
Subsection c mandates that, at the time that forest
185

See GAO, supra note 58, at 41.

boundaries are re-drawn, any existing wilderness areas will
be protected by a conservation easement.

As stated above,

the original Thoreau model divided the management of
wilderness and national forests.186
1

s'

By including

x

wilderness within the management of a National Forest Unit,
trustees can better incorporate ecosystem management since
the boundaries of an ecosystem may include both wilderness
and non-wilderness lands.
Section 7 establishes an independent biodiversity trust
as a means for species preservation to actively compete with
resource commodities.

The biodiversity trust would be

governed by a board of trustees drawn from scientists that
represent areas of concern. Subsection b provides a
considerable amount of flexibility for the Biodiversity
Trust.

If a linkage necessary for the protection of an

endangered or threatened species is outside the boundaries
of National Forest Unit, the linkage can be protected
through the purchase of conservation units.

In order to

avoid administrative drain of trust resources, subsection c
mandates that the vast majority of trust funds must be spent
on the ground purchasing easements for species protection.
The National Forest Trust Act is not designed to
eliminate all of the inefficiencies of Forest Service
management.

However, as a comparative model it is superior

to the current regime that promotes economic inefficiencies
186

Thoreau Institute, supra note 155, at 44.-
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and ecological destruction.

It is my/hope that the trust

paradigm be debated and improved bn in

order to provide

some reform of the current system.

IV.

Conclusion

The current problems with the Forest Service are well
documented.

Due to its roots in the Progressive Era, the

Forest Service has not evolved into an agency capable of
balancing the competing needs of public forest users;
Instead, overcentralization has resulted in a top-down
management approach that eater's to the most powerful
interest groups*.

This management.style will hinder the

Forest Service's shift to.ecosystem management.
V

*

,

Furthermore, the agency budget structure and notions of
community stability have created incentives to sell timber
below' cost, resulting in both a net drain on the treasury
and environmentally destructive logging.
These problems with the Forest Service have evolved for
almost a century and are too ingrained to be addressed by
any piecemeal reform.

Instead, a large scale reform of the

entire structure needs to initiated and a new paradigm for
public forest management instituted.

One possible paradigm

could be a decentralized trust system governing national
forest units that encompass individual watersheds.
Based on land management policies in the school trust
lands context, a trust paradigm would.have many advantages
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for national forest management-.

Trusts provide clear

mandates for the trustee, instead of confusing multiple use
mandates.

Based on an established common law, trustees are

directly accountable to the beneficiary in perpetuity.

Most
%
of the destructive economic incentives would be eliminated
under a trust1paradigm.. The competing duties of making the
trust productive and preserving the corpus of the trust
force trustees to balance short term economic needs and’long
term preservation.
The "National Forest Trust Act", as proposed and
modified in this paper can provide a worthwhile departure
into examining how a trust paradigm for national forest
management would be created.

Trust language that mandates

that lands be managed in accordance with accepted trust
principles -and implementing ecosystem management will
provide a clean break'with ingrained multiple use,, sustained'
yield practices arid usher in a new era of national forest
management•
However, the National Forest Trust Act also highlights
some of the obstacles that must be surmounted before a trust
paradigm can be adopted, namely the question of who is the
beneficiary.

Any meaningful.reform must not name a 1
I

-

beneficiary class that is too large where clarity in trust
mandates are lost and multiple use principles are embraced
all over again.

Furthermore, managing national forests "in

trust for the people of the United States" will create a
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public trust regime that does- not have the accepted legal
theory as private trusts and may not apply to all of the
resources found in the national forests.
While the concept of a trust paradigm for national
forest management would require a complete revision of the
Forest Service as we now know it, it should be seriously
debated and analyzed for possible application.

The

traditional opponents of trust management,.
environmentalists, should take a fresh look at the
possibilities that a trust may present for environmental
protection.

However, as with any reform, compromise is

necessary for any meaningful change. All national forest
»
users are ,going to have to give up some of the benefits they
■now enjoy, whether that means losing free recreation,
subsidized.resource extraction,' or national control.
users are willing to do that, any reform is unlikely.

Until
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APPEND.IX I:

National Forest Trust Act ■
A Bill

To improve economic efficiency and environmental quality of
the Nation's renewable forest and rangeland resources
management.'
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the United States of -America in
Congress Assembled,
Section 1.

SHORT TITLE
\

This Act may be cited as t h e ."National Forest Trust
A c t ."
Section 2.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the Nation's
renewable forest and rangeland resources be managed by the
Forest Service so as to ,provide for the greatest economic
efficiency, environmental quality, and responsiveness to
public demand for resources.
Section 3.

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Act(a) the term "National Forest System" means the
national forests, national grasslands, and other lands
managed by the U.S.D.A. Forest Service;
(b) the- term "proclaimed national forest" means the
current Congressional designations of national forest or
national grasslands and their boundaries;
(c) the term "National Forest Unit" means one of a

number of management units of the National Forest System as
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture under section 4„
paragraph a of this Act;
(d) the term "National Forest Trust" means a chartered
organization, with a membership and a board of trustees
elected by the membership, that is authorized and obligated
to manage a National Forest Unit in trust for the support of
public schools in the United States.
(e) the term "secretary" means the secretary of the
Department of Agriculture.
Section 4.

NATIONAL FOREST TRUSTS.

(a) Within four months of the- passage of this Act, the
Secretary of Agriculture shall draft a division of all
lands, including wildernesses and wild and scenic rivers, in
the National Forest System into individual National Forest
Units,, establishing clear boundaries for each unit.

Such

boundaries shall closely approximate the recognized
boundaries of individual watersheds.

In order to more

closely approximate the geography of individual watersheds,
the boundaries may be drawn with no regard for current'
political boundaries.

Final determination of. National•

Forest Unit boundaries shall be made after 3 0 days of public
comment but no later than six months after passage of this
A ct.
(b). The Secretary shall appoint an interim supervisor
.for each National Forest Unit.

The interim supervisor shall
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carry out the laws and regulations of the Forest Service
until the first meeting of the Board of Trustees of the '
National Forest Unit.
(c) Upon establishment of the National Forest Unit
boundaries, the Secretary shall create for each unit a
National Forest Trust, which shall be a. not-for-profit
corporation chartered under the laws of the United States.
Any citizen of the United States can become a member of any
National Forest Trust for a nominal annual fee, initially
set at $20 per year, paid to the supervisor or interim,
supervisor of the National Forest Unit.

Each trust shall

have complete management jurisdiction over the lands and
resources subject with the associated National Forest Unit,
subject to the provisions of section 4, paragraphs e, f, g,,
and h,' of this Act.
(d) Within 90 days of the establishment of each
national Forest Trust, the interim supervisor of each'
National Forest Unit shall arrange for members to elect, bymail-in ballot, a nine-member Board of Trustees.

Board

members shall have three-year terms, with three members
elected each year.
. (e) The Board of Trustees for each National Forest
Trust shall be obligated to manage the associated National
Forest Uni't in trust for the public schools in the United
States.

Such management shall be in accordance with

established duties of the trustee, balancing the duty to
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make the trust productive, and the duty to preserve the
corpus of the trust as a prudent investor would.

Every

attempt' at implementing management at’ an ecosystem scale
will be undertaken by the Board.

Such management shall also

be subject to those federal laws that would apply to any
private land trust or land owner.
(f)

The Board of Trustees of each National Forest Unit:-

shall have the following powers:
(1) The power to select from among themselves a
chair and other officers as deemed appropriate;
(2) The power to hire and fire the supervisor,of
t.he National Forest Unit;
(3) The power to approve an annual operating plan,
including the establishment of budgets, fees,
activities and projects, the allocations of land to
various uses, and criteria and procedures used to sell
or lease’resources within the jurisdiction of the
National Forest Trust;
(4) The power to set membership fees arid arrange
annual, mail-in elections for members of the Board.
(g) Notwithstanding the provisidris of any other law, .
each National Forest Unit may charge fees at fair market
value for any of the resources within their jurisdiction
s

subject to the requirements of section 4, paragraph e of
this Act.
(h) The Board of Trustees shall not sell any of the

lands within their jurisdictions.

However, •they may-

exchange land for land of equal value if such an exchange
will ease the management of lands in their jurisdiction and
such exchanges meet the objectives specified in section 4,
paragraph e of this Act.

The Board of Trustees may also -

acquire more land from public or pi^Lvate sources and if such
acquisitions meet the objectives specified in section 5,
paragraph e of this Act.
(i)

Board members shall receive- no compensation for

their time, but may elect'to reimburse themselves for costs
traveling to and from and participating in board meetings.
(j) A court, with the appropriate subject matter
jurisdiction, may revoke the charter of any Wilderness Trust
in the event of gross malfeasance or violation of any
provision of section 4 of this Act.
(k) In the event that any National Forest Unit is
unable to sustain itself with the funds provided for it
under section 6 of this Act, the Board of Trustees for that
.

'

•

(

unit may elect to transfer the lands under its jurisdiction
to the jurisdiction of any other willing National Forest
Trust.
Section 5.

(a)

BUDGET AND FINANCE

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,

no funds-may be appropriated to the National-Forest Units or
National Forest Trusts except as described in this section.
(b)

During the first fiscal year beginning after
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passage of this Act, Congress may appropriate funds t o .each
National Forest Unit equal to the funds appropriated for the
management of the lands within such National Forest Unit
during the previous fiscal year,.exclusive of funds spent by
the Regional, Washington, or other non-ranger district or
non-national forest supervisor offices of the Forest
Service.

Those funds spent by the Regional, Washington, or

other non-ranger districts or non-national forest supervisor
offices of the Forest Service will be reallpcated to the
National Forest Units based on need for that fiscal year.
(c)

At the end of. each fiscal year beginning with the

first fiscal year after passage of this Act, the Secretary
of Agriculture shall audit each National Forest Unit to
determine the total funds expended and the total receipts
collected by each unit during that fiscal year.

Receipts

collected by each unit shall be divided as follows:(1) 100 percent of the net receipts shall be
retained by the National Forest Trust to be spent
managing and improving the lands and resources under
the trusts jurisdiction;
(2) 20 percent of the gross receipts shall be paid
to the states for the support of public schools;
(3) All remaining receipts, up to a maximum of 2 0
percent of the gross.receipts, shall be paid to the
National Biodiversity Trust Fund;
(4) All remaining receipts shall be deposited into

65
the general fund of the'United States treasury.
i

(d) National Forest Trusts may retain 100 percent of
any donations paid to the trusts- to spend on managing and
improving the lands and resources under the trust's
jurisdiction, provided that such donations shall, not be made
in exchange for any goods or services provided by the
National Forest unit in the trust's jurisdiction.

Donations

made in exchange for goods or services shall be considered
user fees and shall be distributed as provided in section 5,
paragraph c of this Act.
(e) The distributions of funds described in section 5,
paragraphs c and d of this Act shall not be a part of the
budget of the United States and shall not require annual
approval or appropriation by the United States Congress.
(f) Funds appropriated to the National Forest Units and
Wilderness Systems under section 5, paragraph b, and funds
retained by the National Forest Units under section 5,
paragraph c, and d of this Act that are not spent in any
given fiscal year'may be carried over by such National
Forest or Wilderness System to be spent in any future fiscal
year.
(h)

Trust funds held by the Treasury in account for the

Forest Service under the Act of August 11, 1916, the
Knutsen-Vandenberg Act of 1930, the National Forest Roads
and Trails Act of 1964, and the National Forest Management
Act of 1976 as of the first day of the first fiscal year
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after passage of this Act
shall be made available to the National Forest Units that
generated those funds so that they may be used for the
purposes for which they were intended according to
\

established plans approved by the Supervisors.
Section 6.

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

(a) Supervisors are authorized to sell resource rights
in the form of conservation easements on National Forest
System lands.

Conservation easements may convey rights to

timber harvesting, grazing, mineral development and/or other
uses.

Conservation easements may exist for a limited time

or in perpetuity.

The price of a conservation easement must

equal or exceed the price of commodity uses foregone,
adjusted for the difference in costs of administering the
easement instead of the commodity use; in the case of
renewable resources, the price should also be adjusted for
the future value of the renewed'resource commodities.
(b) Any agency of the Federal Executive, the States and.
any. political or governmental subdivision thereof, any
corporation, not-for-profit corporation, private entity or
person may hold a conservation easement on national forest
land. ■In a transaction involving a contract for use of
forest or rangeland resources, any bids for a conservation
easement on the area must be accorded equal weight with bids
for traditional resource uses; the highest bid shall be
accepted taking into account the true cost of a conservation

easement when adjusted according to the factors detailed in
the previous paragraph.
(c)

At the time that National Forest Unit boundaries

are established in accordance with section 4, paragraph a,
all existing wilderness areas and wild and scenic rivers
found within-proclaimed national forests are placed within a
conservation easement, the term of which are consistent with
the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the Wild and Scenic'Rivers
Act of 1968, in perpetuity.
Section 7.

NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY TRUST

(a) The director of the Smithsonian Institute shall
create a National Biodiversity Trust dedicated to protecting
a repository of diverse ecosystems and habitat for
threatened and endangered species of wildlife.
(b) The National Biodiversity Trust is to be governed
by a Biodiversity Board of Trustees who shall'administer
funds in the National Biodiversity Trust Fund by purchasing
conservation easements or paying landowners or land managers
for providing habitat for threatened and endangered species
of wildlife.

The Biodiversity Board of Trustees shall

‘

consist'of seven members selected by the director of the
Smithsonian Institute each of whom is qualified in
anthropology, biology, zoology, botany, ecology, or other
life and social sciences.
*
(c) No more than 1 percent of the National Biodiversity
Trust Fund may be used for administrative purposes.

No more

than 20 percent of the National Biodiversity Trust Fund may
be used for research and inventory purposes.

The remainder

of the fund must be dedicated to the protection of.
biodiversity, including but not limited to:
(1) The purchase of conservation easements on
public or private.land;
(2) Payments to public land managers or private
landowners who provide habitat for threatened and
endangered species of wildlife;
(3) Grants to, federal, state or local agencies, or
to corporations or individuals, in support of projects
aimed at protecting or improving biodiversity.

